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ALEXANDER J. KALTER*
Generic pharmaceuticals provide the public with the
opportunity to purchase low cost medications after these
medications' patents have expired. This system is created
through the Hatch Waxman Act which strikes an important
balance between providing developmental entities an
opportunity to recoup their research and development costs
through a patent monopoly and allowing generic
alternatives to be developed and FDA approved as a low
cost alternative. This balance creates an innovative engine
that powers both economic improvement and public health.
This balance is at risk after the Federal Circuit's 2010
decision in Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharmaceutical
Laboratories, Inc. The outcome of this case allows
developmental entities to use the FDA regulation system to
lengthen their pharmaceutical monopolies. This paper will
discuss the interaction between the patent system and FDA
regulation, the policies that are at issue, the effects ofNovo
Nordisk, and potential solutions to this unique problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
Entrepreneurship is the engine that powers innovation. Professor Greg
Watson of the University of Pennsylvania defines entrepreneurship as "a
process through which individuals identify opportunities, allocate
resources, and create value."' He elaborates on this point by stating that
value is often created "through the identification of unmet needs or through
the identification of opportunities for change."2 The scope of the
entrepreneurial spirit is broader than just a small start-up or a sole
proprietorship, it encompasses innovation at all levels of business.
Innovation is powered by entrepreneurship and the United States Patent
System provides a policy structure which allows innovation to move with
continuous acceleration. This system is so paramount to improvements in
technology that in 1858 Abraham Lincoln stated that the discovery of
America, the perfection of printing and the introduction of patent laws were
* Juris Doctor, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, expected 2013.
Greg Watson, Definition ofEntrepreneurship, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, EDUC., &
ETHIcs, http://www.gregwatson.com/entrepreneurship-definition/ (last visited Mar.
28, 2012).
2id.
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the three most important developments in the world's history. A patent
accelerates innovation as a dual-engine system. A patent is ostensibly a
contract between, an inventive entity and the government, or, put
differently, an inventive entity and the American people. The inventor
receives a twenty-year monopoly on the sale and use of the invention in
exchange for releasing the invention to the public in a manner in which one
skilled in the art of the particular invention will be able to use the invention
without undue experimentation. a
This creates an incentive for innovation in two ways. The first incentive
is the obvious monetary incentive that an inventive entity will hold a
monopoly over the technology for twenty years offering the inventive entity
an opportunity to recoup upfront research and development costs and profit
from the investment.5 The second incentive is the expiration of the patent.6
The expiration of patent protection allows any entity in the public domain
to copy and use the invention without first acquiring a license from the
patent holder and without the risk of infringement.7 At first blush this may
seem to weaken the incentive for invention because of the risk that the
invention's economic success will not be enough to recover the initial
research and development costs, as well as the production and marketing
costs of selling a new product or a product with novel aspects. There are
certainly instances where obtaining patent protection was not, in retrospect,
an economically sound decision, but this is a case-by-case analysis and
patent protection is often crucial to securing economic protection of an
invention and ensuring the invention becomes profitable for the inventive
8entity.
3 Points to Ponder: A Patent for a President, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE KIDS' PAGES, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ahrpa/opa/kids/
ponder/ponderl.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2012). Another historical anecdote
comes from the War of 1812 when the British burned every government building in
Washington D.C. except the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Great Patent Fire
oft 836, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE KIDS' PAGES,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ahrpa/opa/kids/special/I 836fire.htm (last
visited Mar. 28, 2012).4 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
5 Patent Economics: Part 4-Incentives, PAT. PROSPECTOR (Apr. 17, 2005),
http://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2005/04/patent-economics-part-4-incent.html.6 Id.
7Id.
8 Guriqbal Singh Jaiya & Christopher M. Kalanje, Managing Patent Costs: An
Overview, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/
www/sme/en/documents/pdf/managingpatent-costs.pdf (last visited Mar. 28,
2012).
Merely because an invention meets the criteria of patentability,
one should not rush to file a patent application. As a rule of
thumb, an enterprise, big or small, should obtain and maintain
patent protection over inventions that are or will be used for
developing commercially useful technologies and products.
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The limited number of years of a patent furthers the policy of
innovation originally formulated by the Founders during the drafting of the
Constitution. Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution states: "To
promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries. . . .9 This clause is often referred to as the Patent
and Copyright Clause, Intellectual Property Clause, or just the Progress
Clause. 10 The name "Progress Clause" highlights the focus on innovation.1'
The original constitutional policy of the Patent and Copyright Clause and
the patent laws promulgated by this clause was the promotion of progress
and innovation. 12 Without an end to the twenty-year monopoly granted in a
patent there would be less incentive for the inventive entity to improve on
its technology or invent new technologies because it would be able to
perpetually profit from their original idea. It would still be incentivized to
improve on its technologies to create more monopolies, but a certainty that
the monopoly will end increases the incentive to continue improving on
existing technologies. This would limit the "Progress" that the Founders
wanted to facilitate in the Constitution. In a more general scope, progress,
innovation, and entrepreneurship are intertwining concepts and are
pervasive themes of the American experience starting from the county's
inception.
This promotion of progress and innovation through the expiration of
patents and the incentive that creates for research and development in new
technologies is threatened by the recent holding in Novo Nordisk A/S v.
While the cost of acquiring and maintaining patent protection
may be significant, it should be noted that patent costs are
generally only a small component of the total cost incurred in
turning an invention into a commercially useful technology or
product, and of marketing and selling it in the domestic or export
markets. However, if there is good reason to believe that the
profits from an invention will not justify the investment in
obtaining patent protection, then, by all means, one should not
patent it.
Id.
9 U.S. CONST. art. VIII, § 8.
1o Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8, THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, http://press-
plubs.uchicago.edu/founders/tocs/al 8 8.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
'Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts.
The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United
States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 52 (1994) (explainings that the
Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution's goal to promote progress equates
to innovation in today's society, "to promote the progress of useful arts
presupposed an intent to advance or forward the course or procession of such
trades.").
12 id.
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Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories13 (Novo Nordisk) from the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The holding of Novo Nordisk created
new developments in patent law with respect to the pharmaceutical
industry, which will allow a pharmaceutical company to lengthen its
monopoly on a drug by amending the use code required by the FDA to box
out generic competitors who are trying to gain approval for a generic
version of a drug before the patent expires. 14 Pharmaceutical companies
have always been able to obtain a patent on a new use or new combination
of a drug, but based on the holding in Novo Nordisk, a new use or new
combination patent could be used in the FDA process to block any generic
competitors from reaching the shelves. While the patent will have expired,
the monopoly will remain. 15 The effect of this will be detrimental to the
generic pharmaceutical industry and to pharmaceutical innovation.
The ability for generic pharmaceutical companies to compete with
name brand pharmaceutical companies creates a competitive market that
benefits economic growth and the public at large. Generic pharmaceutical
companies provide many important checks and pressures on the
pharmaceutical industry.16 They are able to offer medicine to the general
public at a greatly reduced price once the patent covering the drug has
expired.'7 More importantly, their competition drives the name brand, or
developmental drug companies to continuously create new and improved
drugs in order to stay competitive. This balance creates an economic
powerhouse of front-end innovation driven by back-end competition. This
allows the developmental drug companies to make huge profits through
their patented drugs, creates a secondary market of generics, and provides
the consumer a continuously healthier life at a reduced price.,
8
The recent ruling in Novo Nordisk has made it easier for developmental
pharmaceutical companies to lengthen their patents and effectively box out
the generic competitors by manipulating the FDA approval process. 19 This
holding will have major effects on the pharmaceutical industry in the short
and long run. In order to maintain the balance and drive of innovation
furthered by the current generic pharmaceutical system, the Supreme Court
should overturn this holding or Congress should amend the law to remove
this statutory outcome.
13 Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., 601 F.3d 1359, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d
1031 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk
A/S, 131 S. Ct. 3057, 180 L. Ed. 2d 884 (2011).
14 Novo Nordisk A/S , 601 F.3d 1359.
15 id.
16 David Reiffen & Michael R. Ward, Generic Drug Industry Dynamics, FED.
TRADE COMM'N (Feb. 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/
industrydynamicsreiffenwp.pdf.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Novo NordiskA/S, 601 F.3d 1359.
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II. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND OF PATENT LAW
The current patent law is based on the Patent Act of 1952, codified in
Title 35 of the United States Code.20 This statute allows inventors to obtain
patents on processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter
that are useful, new, and non-obvious. 21 Granted patents confer the right to
exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing
22into the United States the patented invention. A patent is a quid pro quo
with the U.S. government that the inventive entity will receive a monopoly
(generally of twenty years from the date of application) in exchange for the
divulgence of all the necessary information for the invention to be
23
replicated by someone who is skilled in the area of the invention. This
way when the patent expires, the public at large is free to replicate the
invention.24 This fosters the spread of ideas and gives an economic
incentive to innovate.
The primary requirements for patentability are novelty, usefulness and
non-obviousness.25 Novelty means that an invention must be new to be
patentable.26 A person is not entitled to a patent if the invention was known
or used by others in this country or patented or described in this or a foreign
country before the invention by the applicant for the patent.27 This prior
knowledge, description, or existence of the widget trying to be patented is
called prior art.28
United States patent law is statutory, and while Title 35 of the U.S.
Code contains many provisions, four sections of the patent law carry
particular importance with respect to patentability of inventions (101, 102
and 103)29 and the specification of a patent (112). 30 Section 101 discusses
20 The law is currently changing under the America Invents Act of 2011, which is
slowly being implemented. This will change some of the statutory language, and an
understanding of these changes will come over time as much of the new language
will still need to be litigated for practitioners to truly get a handle on their breadth.
21 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
22 Wendy H. Schacht & John R. Thomas, Patent Law and Its Application to the
Pharmaceutical Industry: An Examination of the Drug Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act of 1984 ("The Hatch- Waxman Act'), CRS REPORT OF
CONGRESS 15-16 (Jan. 10, 2005), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/
marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/r13075601102005.pdf [hereinafter Patent Law]
discussing 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(g) (2006)).
3 AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("[A]s part of the
quid pro quo of the patent bargain, the applicant's specification must enable one of
ordinary skill in the art to practice the full scope of the claimed invention.").
24 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006).
2535 U.S.C. §§ 102-103.
26 35 U.S.C. § 102.
27 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-104.
28 Id.
29 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103.
30 35 U.S.C. § 112.
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which inventions are patentable. 3' Not every new idea is patentable. The
statute states that "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new or useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title. 32 Pure ideas and natural
phenomenon cannot be patented because they do not meet this patentability
requirement of section 101. Section 102 discusses the conditions required
for patentability including novelty and the loss of right to patent.33 The
section lists instances when a person is not entitled to a patent even though
the invention passed muster under section 101. 34 An invention is not
patentable if it was known, used, patented or described in a publication, in
the U.S or a foreign country before the invention by the applicant.35 An
invention is also not patentable if the inventor has abandoned the invention
or the inventor did not actually invent the subject matter sought to be
patented.36
Section 103 also discusses the conditions required for patentability,
focusing on the requirement of non-obvious subject matter.37 The
requirement for non-obvious subject matter is found in part (a) of section
103:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102
of this title, if the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Patentability shall not be negative by the manner in which
the invention was made.38
The section 103 requirement for patentability is that the invention must
be non-obvious to someone skilled in the art of the invention.39 The term
"art" in the patent context means the area or field of the invention.40 For
example, a patent for a new strain of drug would be in the "art" of
pharmaceuticals, pharmacology, or biochemistry.
3 35 U.S.C. § 101.
32 id.
3' 35 U.S.C. § 102.34 id.
35 id.36 id.
3' 35 U.S.C. § 103.
38 Id.
39 id.
40 U.S. CONST. art. VIII, § 8. 'To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts .... "
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The phrase "person having ordinary skill in the art" (sometimes
shortened PHOSITA) is a legally significant phrase that has been judicially
defined.4' The Federal Circuit in Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil
Co.42 created a six-factor test to determine whether someone is a PHOSITA.
These factors included "[1] the education level of the inventor; [2] type of
problems encountered in the art; [3] prior art solutions to those problems;
[4] rapidity with which innovations are made; [5] sophistication of the
technology; and [6] educational level of active workers in the field. ' ' 3 The
Supreme Court refined the capabilities of a PHOSITA in the 2007 case KSR
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.44 stating that "[a] person of ordinary skill
in the art is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.''45 Even
if there is not a reference that anticipates the patent, the claim is not
patentable if the differences between the claim and the prior art at the time
of the invention are obvious to someone of ordinary skill in the art.
Obviousness is determined by looking at four factors laid out by the
Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City.46 These
factors are the Supreme Court's statutory interpretation of section 103.47
The four factors are the scope and content of the prior art, the level of
ordinary skill in the art, the differences between the claimed invention and
the prior art and objective evidence of non-obviousness (this objective
evidence is called secondary concerns).4
41 Ordinary Skill in the Art, THE PAT. PROSPECTOR, (May 9, 2007),
http://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2007/05/ordinary skill in the art 1.html.
42 Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
43 id.
44 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).45 Id. at 421 (emphasizing that this definition was more of a refinement and did not
necessarily overturn all other Federal Circuit precedent, i.e. Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v.
Union Oil Co.).
46 Graham v. John Deer Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
47 id.
48 Id. KSR Int'l added to these factors by laying out an additional set of factors.
Existence of any of these factors would support a conclusion of obviousness and
include: (1) combining prior art elements according to known methods to yield
predictable results, (2) simple substitution of one known element for another to
obtain predictable results, (3) use of a known technique to improve similar devices,
methods, or products in the same way, (4) applying a known technique to a known
device, method, or product ready for improvement to yield predictable results, (5)
obvious to try (i.e. there are a limited number of solutions to a known problem), (6)
known work in one field may prompt variations of it for use in the same field or a
different one based on design incentive or market forces, (7) some teaching,
suggestion, or motivation in the prior art that would have lead one of ordinary skill
in the art to use the prior art to create the claimed invention). KSR Int'l, 550 U.S.
398.
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Finally, section 112 describes the specification requirement in a
patent.49 The specification is a written description of the invention and is
part of the patent application.50
The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and
using it, in such clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable
any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention.51
Section 112 continues by describing what is required of the claims, the
language in the patent application that is written immediately after the
specification.52
The claims of a patent are the operative language that defines the scope
and contours of the property right granted in the patent.53 The property right
granted in a patent through the patent claims is a right to exclude.54 In the
classic bundle-of-sticks model of property rights, the patent holder holds a
"right to exclude" stick for the scope of the patent claims for the 20-year
patent term. Section 112 of Title 35 contains the statutory language
describing the general structure of claims. "The specification shall conclude
with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming
the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." 55 A claim
can be written in independent or dependent form.56 Independent claims are
claims that, as a whole, describe the invention or an independent feature of
the invention.57 A dependent claim is a claim that adds at least one
additional element to an independent claim.58 Dependent claims can depend
on other dependent claims, with each claim adding an additional feature or
features to the original independent claim. 59 Claims are always one sentence
49 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
50 Id.
51 Id
52 id.
53 David V. Radack, Reading and Understanding Patent Claims, 47 JOM 69
(1995), available at http://www.tms.org/pubs/joumals/jom/matters/matters-
951 l.html.
54 id.
55 id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
'9 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). Theexact language of the part of§ 112 which explains
"claims" states that:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject
matter which the applicant regards as his invention. A claim may
be written in independent or, if the nature of the case admits, in
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and are broken into three distinct parts; the preamble,6 ° the transitional
phrase,6' and the set of limitations.62
dependent or multiple dependent form. Subject to the following
paragraph, a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to
a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation
of the subject matter claimed. A claim in dependent form shall be
construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the
claim to which it refers. A claim in multiple dependent form shall
contain a reference, in the alternative only, to more than one
claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of
the subject matter claimed. A multiple dependent claim shall not
serve as a basis for any other multiple dependent claim. A
multiple dependent claim shall be construed to incorporate by
reference all the limitations of the particular claim in relation to
which it is being considered. An element in a claim for a
combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing
a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or
acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to
cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in
the specification and equivalents thereof
Id.
60 2111.02 Effect of Preamble [R-3]-2100 Patentability, U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE (Dec. 18, 2008, 11:40 AM), http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/pac/mpep/documents/2100 2111 02.htm. The claim preamble either
creates a limiting structure or a recitation of purpose of intended use. Any
terminology in the preamble that limits the structure of the claimed invention must
be treated as a claim limitation. See, e.g., Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec.
U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1962, 1966 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(determining whether preamble recitations are structural limitations can be resolved
only on review of the entirety of the application "to gain an understanding of what
the inventors actually invented and intended to encompass by the claim").
The claim preamble must be read in the context of the entire claim.
The determination of whether preamble recitations are structural
limitations or mere statements of purpose or use "can be resolved
only on review of the entirety of the [record] to gain an
understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended
to encompass by the claim.
Corning Glass Works, 868 U.S. at 1257.
61 2111.03 Transitional Phrases [R-3]-21 00 Patentability, U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE (Dec. 18, 2008, 11:40 AM), http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/pac/mpep/documents/2100 2111_03.htm.
The transitional phrases "comprising," "consisting essentially of'
and "consisting of' define the scope of a claim with respect to
what unrecited additional components or steps, if any, are excluded
from the scope of the claim .... The transitional term
"comprising," which is synonymous with "including,"
"containing," or "characterized by," is inclusive or open-ended and
does not exclude additional, unrecited elements or method steps.
Id.
See, e.g., Mars Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 377 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("like
the term 'comprising,' the terms 'containing' and 'mixture' are open-ended"); In re
Gray, 53 F.2d 520 (C.C.P.A. 1931) ("The transitional phrase 'consisting of
2012
202 OHIO STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL Vol. 7:1
BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
The United States is currently on a first-to-invent system, meaning that
someone can still receive a patent even if they lose the race to file in the
patent office.63 This will change with the implementation of the America
Invents Act of 2011, which changes the United States from a first-to-invent
patent system into a first-to-file system. 64 This change becomes effective in
late 2012 and from that point on the first person to file the patent with the
office (assuming it is a patentable invention) will receive the rights to the
65invention.
Part of the patent agreement between the inventor and the government
is that the inventor receives a monopoly for twenty years from the date of
filing for the patent on the invention.
For patents resulting from publications filed after June 8,
1995, the patent term is ordinarily twenty years from the
date the patent application was filed. For patents issued
prior to June 8, 1995, as well as for patents resulting from
applications pending at the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office as of that date, the patent endures for the greater of
66twenty years from filing or seventeen years from grant.
This is a major issue in pharmaceuticals because there is an extended
period of time after filing but before the first sale of the drug can be made
in which the drug has to go through extensive testing from the Food and
Drug Administration before approval for sale. This is a lengthy and
expensive process that is only required of the developmental drug
67
companies.
excludes any element, step, or ingredient not specified in the claim"); Ex parte
Davis, 80 U.S.P.Q. 448, 450 (Bd. App. 1948) ("consisting of' defined as "closing
the claim to the inclusion of materials other than those recited except for impurities
ordinarily associated therewith"). The transitional phrase "consisting essentially of'
limits the scope of a claim to the specified materials or steps "and those that do not
materially affect the basic and novel characteristic(s)" of the claimed invention. In
re Herz, 537 F.2d 549, 551-52 (C.C.P.A. 1976). (emphasis in original).
62 The set of limitations together describe the invention and define the scope-of
B3roperty rights the inventive entity has in the invention.
First-to-File vs. First-to-Invent: Who Really Benefits from Changing the U.S.
Patent System?, WEALTH OF IDEAS NEWSL. (Oct. 2007), available at
http://www.generalpatent.com/first-file-vs-first-invent-who-really-benefits-
changing-u-s-patent-system.
65 Id. (discussing the America Invents Act of 2011).
65 Id.66 Patent Law, supra note 22.
67 The FDA 's Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/drugs/
resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143534.htm. (explaining the FDA drug approval
process).
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III. THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION'S
NEW DRUG APPLICATION PROCESS
The process a drug undergoes between initial laboratory discoveries
and store shelves is a long process, with most drugs going the way of the
lowly Bill on Capitol Hill who is still "just a bill., 68 Most drugs that go
through preclinical testing (animal testing) never reach the human testing
69stage or undergo Food and Drug Administration (FDA) review.
Sometimes drugs are initially researched for a particular purpose and are
later discovered to be effective for another use.7 ° For example, Retrovir
(zidovudine) was originally studied in the 1960s as an anti-cancer drug
without success. 71 In the 1980s, it was realized that the drug could be used
to treat AIDS and was finally approved by the FDA to treat AIDS in 1987.72
This is the lengthy process that generic pharmaceuticals are able to
mostly circumvent by showing that their drug is effectively identical to the
developmental drug company's product. The process through which the
generic companies essentially "piggyback" off the developmental
company's research and testing will be discussed in greater .detail below.
This is a major advantage for generic companies.
A. The New Drug Application Process
FDA drug review for approval of a new drug is a twelve-step process.
Step one is preclinical trials, which consist primarily of animal testing.73
Step two is an investigational new drug application ([NDA).74 Sponsors,
who include companies, research institutions and other organizations, who
are responsible for the development of the drug, have to show the FDA the
results of the preclinical testing and explain what their plans are for human
testing in clinical trials.75
The next three steps are the three phases of clinical trials. Clinical trials
-are drug studies in humans and can only start once the INDA is reviewed by
the FDA through a local institutional review board. This board is a panel of
scientists and non-scientists employed by hospitals and research faculties
that oversee clinical research.76 The local institutional review board also
68 I'm Just a Bill, SCHOOLHOUSE ROCK, available at http://www.schoolhouserock.
tv/Bill.html.
69 The FDA 's Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, supra
note 67.
70 Id.
71 id
72 Id
73 id.
74 id.
75 The FDA 's Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, supra
note 67.76 Id.
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approves the clinical trial "protocols. 77 The first phase of clinical trials
(step three) is typically done with twenty to eighty healthy volunteers and
the emphasis is the safety of the new drug. 78 The goal is to determine the
most common side effects, and how the drug is metabolized and excreted.79
The second phase of clinical studies (step four) begins if the toxicity
measurements from the first phase are at an acceptable level.80 Up to three
hundred volunteers are studied in phase two and the emphasis of this phase
is on the effectiveness of the new drug.81 The goal is to figure out whether
the drug works to treat certain diseases or conditions. This is usually done
by giving the drug to one patient and a placebo or a different drug to a
similar patient. 83 After this stage, the sponsors and the FDA reconvene to
discuss how the large-scale studies of phase three will be performed.
84
Phase three of clinical trials will only begin if effectiveness is shown in
phase two.85 Phase three is a larger-scale study with up to 3000
volunteers.86 The purpose is to measure the effectiveness and safety of the
87new drug on a larger scale, using a variety of populations and dosages.
The next step of the new drug review process is the pre-NDA (New
Drug Application) period.88 During this time, the sponsor fulfills post-
market and commitment study requirements, which are used by the FDA to
gather more information about a drug's safety, efficacy or optimal use.89
Once the pre-NDA period is completed, the review process continues to the
NDA stage.90 This is the formal step in which the sponsor discloses all their
animal and human testing data to the FDA and requests that the FDA
consider approving the new drug for marketing in the United States.91 The
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 198492
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 The FDA 's Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, supra
note 67.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 id.
87 The FDA's Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, supra
note 67.88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
92 Patent Law, supra note 22. This is often called the Hatch-Waxman Act and
creates the modem drug approval system with respect to patents. This system lays
out the requirements for a new drug to be approved patents and sets up the modem
system of generic drugs. This will be discussed in greater detail infra.
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explained that as part of the NDA process, the sponsor must also identify all
patents that claim the drug or a method of its use.93
The applicant shall file with the application the patent
number and the expiration date of any patent which claims
the drug for which the applicant submitted the application
or which claims a method of using such drug and with
respect to which a claim of patent infringement could
reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by the
owner engaged in the manufacture, use, sale, of the drug.
9 4
When the FDA receives an NDA, they have sixty days to decide
whether to file the application for review.95 Once the FDA approves the file
for review the NDA undergoes a much more rigorous evaluation to
determine whether the drug is safe for use in the United States. 96 The FDA
puts together a review team which consists of doctors, statisticians,
scientists, and other experts, who evaluate whether the drug is safe and
effective for the proposed use.97 When determining safety, the review team
acknowledges that no drugs are completely safe, so the main inquiry is
whether the benefits of the drug outweigh the risks. These risks are
colloquially known as the side effects of the drug. The review team also
analyzes the tests that the sponsor used to determine the safety and
effectiveness of the drug to determine whether these were effective and
whether there were any flaws in the studies. 98 The reviewers determine
whether they agree with the results of the sponsor's studies.99 The reviewers
then create a written evaluation of their conclusions and recommendations
with respect to the drug.'00
When the FDA would like a more thorough review of the new drug
they will occasionally use advisory committees. Mark Goldberger, a former
director of the FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER),
indicates certain situations when the FDA would decide this is a necessary
step. His analysis includes looking at whether "it's a drug that has
significant questions, [] it's the first in its class, or the first for a given
93 Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 601 F.3d 1359, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2010). See also 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2006).
94 Novo NordiskA/S, 601 F.3d at 1360-61. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (b)(1)(G)
emphasis added by Novo Nordisk).
5 The FDA 's Drug Review Process. Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, supra
note 67.
96 id.
97 id.
98 id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
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indication."'10 1 Generally, when these situations are presented, the FDA will
take the advice of its advisory committees, but this is not always the case.
The final three steps for approval -start with an FDA review of the
information that goes on the drugs professional labeling, which describes
how to use the drug. 10 2 Next, the FDA evaluates the facilities where the
drug will be manufactured to ensure they meet FDA standards. 10 3 Finally,
the FDA reviewers will either approve the application or issue a complete
response letter explaining any flaws or issues with the application or the
drug testing process.'04
Once a new drug is approved for use by the FDA, the developmental
entity is required to register any patents which claim one or more methods
of using this drug in the FDA Orange Book through the "use code
narrative."'0 5 This narrative is a description of each of these claimed
processes. 10 6 The use code is a unique number assigned to each of these
descriptions. The effect this use code has on the generic drug process is
central to the issue in Novo Nordisk and will be discussed further infra.
B. Policy Considerations of the New Drug Application Process
This expensive and extensive process is a major argument for
increasing the protection of developmental pharmaceutical companies.
Developmental pharmaceutical companies already have the high research
and development costs that any inventive entity must pay to develop a new
invention, and they also have the unique extra testing that is required by the
FDA's new drug application review process. 10 7 Because of this,
developmental drug companies are taking on larger risks when they acquire
a patent. 10 8 This highlights the reasoning behind arguments to lengthen the
patent term for pharmaceutical inventions or to provide avenues for certain
pharmaceutical patents to gain term extensions.
But there are flaws and criticisms to this argument and to the current
pharmaceutical industry model as a whole. These include the financial
101 The FDA's Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, supra
note 67.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 1d
105 Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., 601 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir.
2010) Tthe Orange Book is the colloquial name for the Approved Drug Products
with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations; it is essentially the FDA directory of all
approved drugs and their respective patents. Id.
1 Id.
107 Erica Westly, The Price of Winning FDA Approval, FAST CO. (Dec. 1, 2009),
http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/141/the-price-of-approval.html (stating
that the average out-of-pocket cost for developing a new drug, from inception to
aproval is $494 million dollars).
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barriers that prevent many people in both the developing and developed
world from accessing medications, in light of the industry's high profits,
and the amount of spending on advertising and marketing, among other
issues. 10 9 The National Institute of Health, Department of Clinical Studies
cited six major problems with the patent based drug development system. "10
These include:
(1) recovery of research costs by patent monopoly reduces
access to drugs; (2) market demand rather than health
needs determines research priorities; (3) resources between
research and marketing are misallocated; (4) the market for
drugs has inherent market failures; (5) overall investment
in drug research and development is too low, compared
with profits; and (6) the existing system discriminates
against U.S. patients."1
These problems were all cited in 2005, before the Novo Nordisk
decision. Novo Nordisk further adds to the power developmental drug
companies have over the process and the profits of the pharmaceutical
industry. This power is often to the detriment of the health of society and to
the detriment of a system of generic medications, which provide an engine
for pharmaceutical innovation.
Typically someone receives a patent for an entirely new invention, but
one can also get an improvement patent for an innovation that provides a
new use for an existing invention. The Supreme Court first allowed new use
patents in 1892 through the holding of Ansonia Brass & Co. v. Electric
Supply Co. 112 The Court stated:
[I]f an old device or process be put to a new use which is
not analogous to the old one, and the adaptation of such
process to the new use is of such a character as to require
the exercise of inventive skill to produce it, such new use
will not be denied the merit of patentability."'13
New-use inventions are typically done by finding a new and useful
process for a known substance or composition.1 14 The 1952 Patent Act
defined process and included the phrase "includ[ing] a new use of a known
109 J.H. Barton, and E.J. Emanuel, The Patents-Based Pharmaceutical Process:
Rationale, Problems, and Potential Reforms, JAMA, NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH,
DEP'T OF CLINICAL BIOETmics (Oct. 26, 2005), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pubmed/16249422.
10Id
"'1 Id.
112 Ansonia Brass & Co. v. Elec. Supply Co., 144 U.S. 11 (1892).
.
3Id. at 17.
114 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006).
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process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material." '115 An
example of a new-use patent came in 2000 when the Federal Circuit Court
of Appeals allowed a patent for the idea of using Bag Balm-an ointment
normally used to soothe irritated cow udders-to treat human baldness. The
court found it patentable because it was a new use of a known
composition.1 16 This type of patent is similar to the issue found in Novo
Nordisk, in which Novo Nordisk patented a new method of using Prandin.
The court held that this not only created a new patent, but based on
interpretation of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the generic manufactured was
unable to receive FDA approval on the original Prandin formula, effectively
increasing the length of the original patent.
IV. THE DRUG COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM
RESTORATION ACT (HATCH-WAXMAN ACT)
The modem system of generic drugs was created by the Drug
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, otherwise known as the
Hatch-Waxman Act. The Hatch-Waxman Act amended the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act.1 17 This act set up a process in which generic drug
companies can file Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs) to
expedite the FDA approval process. 1 8 A generic drug company can use an
ADNA to receive FDA approval of a U.S. generic drug for an existing
licensed medication that has been previously approved by the FDA through
the twelve-step New Drug Application (NDA) process. 119 The Hatch-
Waxman Act also grants a 180-day exclusivity window to -generic
companies that are the "first-to-file" an ANDA with respect to the
developmental holders of the patent's NDA. 12Q This 180-day exclusivity
allows the first generic to prove bioequivalence and be granted an ANDA.
When the developmental drug patent expires, the first generic equivalent
will be given 180 days to exclude any other generic versions of this drug. 12'
This allows the first generic the profits from being the only alternative to
the name brand version and offers them the opportunity to create brand
recognition in consumers.
115Id.
116 Kirk Teska, What Are Improvement Patents and New Use Patents?, NOLO LAW
FOR ALL, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/improvement-patents-new-use-
patents-30250.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).7 Patent Law, supra note 22.
118 id
119 Id.
120 id.
121 id.
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A. The Abbreviated New Drug Application Process
The basis of the Abbreviated New Drug Application is bioequivalence.
Two pharmaceutical products are bioequivalent if they are
pharmaceutically equivalent and their bioavailabilities (rate
and extent of availability) after administration in the same
molar dose are similar to such a degree that their effects,
with respect to both efficacy and safety, can be expected to
be essentially the same. Pharmaceutical equivalence
implies the same amount of the same active substance(s), in
the same dosage form, for the same route of administration
and meeting the same or comparable standards.
122
This allows generic drug companies to piggyback off the testing efforts
of the developmental pharmaceutical companies by allowing the generic
companies to use previous FDA approval of the drug as long as they prove
bioequivalence.
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984 (the 1984 Act)-commonly known as the
'Hatch-Waxman Act'-made several significant changes to
the patent laws designed to encourage innovation in the
pharmaceutical industry while facilitating the speedy
introduction of lower-cost generic drugs. 123 These changes
include: provisions for extending the term of a patent to
reflect regulatory delays encountered in obtaining
marketing approval by the FDA, a statutory exemption
from patent infringement for activities associated with
regulatory marketing approval, establishment of
mechanisms to challenge the validity of a pharmaceutical
patent, and a reward for disputing the validity,
enforceability, or infringement of a patented and approved
drug. The 1984 Act also provides the FDA with authority
to offer periods of marketing exclusivity for a
pharmaceutical company, independent of the rights
conferred by patents. 124 This means the generic companies
can be ready to put their version of the drug on shelves the
day the patent expires. This also means that the process of
122 Donald J. Birkett, Generics-Equal or Not?, 26 AUSTRALIAN PRESCRIBER 4,
85-87 (2003), available at http://www.australianprescriber.com/upload/
p2df/articles/712.pdf.23 Patent Law, supra note 22.
124 id.
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developing and testing the generic will not be actionable
patent infringement because it is protected activity.
125
Once the generic gains the approved bioequivalence it must assert to
the FDA, that sale of the generic will not infringe on any patents. The first
step in this process is outlined in a provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
The applicant shall file with the application the patent
number and the expiration date of any patent which claims
the drug for which the applicant submitted the application
or which claims a method of using such drug and with
respect to which a claim of patent infringement could
reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by the
owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the
drug.
126
Basically, the applicant must state to the FDA which patents are
related to this proposed generic drug.
The Hatch-Waxman Act discusses ADNAs and states that the FDA is
prohibited from asking a generic drug manufacturer for 'more than
bioavailability studies. 27 The Act lays out conditions for a generic
manufacturer to file an ADNA and at least one of these conditions must be
met. 128 One of the conditions is met if the drug the generic manufacturer is
attempting to emulate is not patented, the patent for the original version has
expired, the generic drug will not go to market until after the original patent
has expired, or it is proven that the development drug patent is not infringed
by the generic version. 29 These four conditions are referred to as paragraph
1-4 certifications.
130
There is also a focus on patent term restoration for developmental
entities in the Hatch-Waxman Act. The bill states that the developmental
drug can receive a patent extension term equal to 50% of the time of the
investigational new drug (IND) period and the NDA process. These are the
three phases of human testing discussed in the previous section. 13' This
entire period runs from the start of human testing to the end of the NDA
review process. 32 These extensions come with a few limitations. The
125 id.
126 Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., 601 F.3d 1359, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir.
2010). See also 21 U.S.C. 355(b)(1) (2012).
127 Gerald J. Mossinehoff. Overview of the Hatch- Waxman Act and Its Impact on
the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 187, 194 (1999), available
at http://www.regulatorypro.com/FDLI%20-%200verview%20ot/o20Hatch-
Waxman%20Act%201984.pdf.128 Id.
129 id.
130 id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
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extension is limited to up to five years. 133 This means that the patent will
not recuperate any time greater than five years, even if the IND and NDA
process exceeds ten years. This is further limited in the Hatch-Waxman
Act, which states that the time the drug can receive protection while on the
market, after it has received FDA approval, cannot exceed fourteen years.
134
This means that a drug which was initially developed relatively quickly in
its pre-clinical trial stages may not receive a full five-year recoupment of
FDA approval delays if it would still enjoy fourteen protected years on the
market. Also the Hatch-Waxman Act states that if the developmental entity
does not exercise due diligence when seeking a patent term restoration, the
delay caused by the lack of due diligence will be subtracted from the final
patent term extension. 135
B. Policy Considerations of the New Drug Application Process
The Hatch-Waxman Act and the entire generic drug system are
premised under two assumptions. The first is that the generic drug is the
same as the developmental drug. 136 This is done through a measure of
bioequivalence. The FDA requirement states that if the proposed generic
has to be within plus-or-minus 20% of the bioavailability of the
developmental drug. 13 7 This means the drug must be 80% or more the same
amount of active ingredient in the blood over time. 38 The margin is
generally a safe one, but there are instances where this could lead to some
dangerous, or at least undesirable, results. One scenario would be a patient
taking a medication that is on the "plus 20%" bioavailability range and
switching to a similar medication that is on the "minus 20%" bioavailability
range. 3 9 The drugs would technically be bioequivalent, but this would be a
40% shift and could potentially have much different effects on the patient.
Some scientists and medical professionals believe that pharmaceutical
technology has advanced enough since the Hatch-Waxman Act was passed
to tighten this bioavailability range in the interest of safety and
effectiveness.140 These scientists believe this would not be overly
133 Mossinghoff, supra note 127.
134 The FDA's Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, supra
note 67.
135 Id.
136 Wendy Schacht & John R. Thomas, The "Hatch- Waxman" Act: Selected
Patent-Related Issues, CONG. RES. SERVICE, THE LmR. OF CONGRESS, RES., SCI.,
AND INDUS. Div. (April 1, 2002), http://congressionalresearch.com/
RL31379/document.php?study=The+Hatch-Waxman+Act.http://
congressionalresearch.com/RL31379/document.php?study=The+Hatch-
Waxman+Act (hereinafter The "Hatch- Waxman " Act). See also Patent Law, supra
note 22.
137 Id.
138 ld.
139 Id.
140 Id.
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detrimental to the generic pharmaceuticals and would benefit the public at
large.
141
The second assumption under which the Hatch-Waxman Act operates is
that establishing similarity between two drugs using bioequivalence is an
effectual replacement for the safety and effectiveness measures used in the
FDA testing process. 142 Can a simple measure of bioequivalence replace the
different phases of testing and years of research and development
undertaken by the developmental drug companies? This may be a concern,
but generic drugs that undergo an ANDA process meet the same FDA
regulatory standards as the original developmental drugs, so these fears
seem somewhat unfounded. 143
The Hatch-Waxman Act strikes a balance between two potentially
competing policy interests: inducing pioneering development of
pharmaceutical formulations and methods and facilitating efficient
transition to a market with low-cost, generic copies of those pioneering
inventions at the close of a patent term.44 This policy balance highlights the
competing policy arguments behind a patent system that favors generic
drug companies, and one that favors developmental drug companies.
The first argument for a system in favor of generic companies is the
public interest in cheap yet safe and effective medicines. A system that
allows generic producers to develop generic drugs at a much lower cost
allows a larger segment of the public to access these medicines. Medication
is unique in the patent world because it is a rare class of patented products
that provide direct care to the public at large. This public interest incentive
of low cost medication allows access to the market by more individuals.
The generic system also allows more business entrance into the
pharmaceutical industry. Generic pharmaceutical companies require less
research and development capital, and research and development is an
expensive investment with a long waiting period on return. 145 This allows a
broader base of entrepreneurial firms to enter the market, employing more
individuals and creating more competition. Increased competition forces all
industry participants to remain price competitive while simultaneously
helping the consumer and the producer.
Another advantage of the generic system and a patent policy favoring
generic pharmaceuticals is the incentive it places on developmental drug
companies to continuously develop new medications. This would still be
141 Id.
142 See Barton and Emanuel, supra note 109.
143 See id.
144 See Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
See also Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 601 F.3d 1359, 1365-66
lFed. Cir. 2010).
4 Why Generics Prescription Drugs Cost Less, HUMANA, http://www.staysmart
stayhealthy.com/genericdrugcosts (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
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the case if the generic system did not exist and pharmaceutical patents were
treated like any other patents, but the incentive for continuous development
would not be as strong. With only a few years of profit between successful'
FDA approval and the expiration of the patent, a developmental drug
company must constantly innovate in order to have a consistent stream of
revenue from patented drugs on the market. Without the strong and
immediate competition from generics, developmental drug companies
would have more time to rest on their laurels and reap the benefits of older
drugs. This drives innovation to more effective medication for the public
and more profits by a broad base of generic and developmental
pharmaceutical companies. The public at large benefits from better and
cheaper drugs, creating an entire industry of generic pharmaceuticals, thus
adding jobs and economic growth. The principle drawback is the lost
marginal profits of the developmental pharmaceutical industry. This does
not mean the developmental pharmaceutical industry is limited in the
amount of money it can make; it just requires them to continue to innovate
in order to maintain their share of the market. Considering innovation and
progress are the original policies stated in the Patent and Copyright Clause
of the U.S. Constitution, 146 the positives of the generic drug system
outweigh the negative from (nearly) every vantage point.
The arguments in favor of a pro-generic system are opposed by policy
arguments aimed at protecting the developmental pharmaceuticals and the
products they create (the One vantage point which might disagree with the
proposition that the positives of the generic drug system outweigh the
negatives). Developmental drug companies are the innovative entities in the
pharmaceutical industry and they should be protected in order to promote
progress and innovation. Without strong patent protection there would be
less incentive for developmental drug companies to spend a large amount of
money on research and development. Patent policies aimed at furthering the
public interest must not overburden the developmental drug company's
incentive to innovate. Otherwise, the steady stream of new medicine
developed by these companies will slow. Developmental companies put all
the investment into the products and they should be rewarded 'for that
investment. Protection of developmental pharmaceuticals is necessary to
maintain continuous development of new medicines and investment in
research and development.
147
These competing policy arguments are at the center of the current issue
regarding the holding of Novo Nordisk. The question in Novo Nordisk
146 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
147 Frank Pasquale, JD, Pharmaceutical Research Expenditures and Industrial
Policy, HEALTH CARE BLOG. (Jan. 3, 2011), http://thehealthcareblog.com/
blog/2011/01/03/pharmaceutical-research-expenditures-and-industrial-policy/
(discussing the policies behind developmental pharmaceutical spending).
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centers around the interpretation of language from the Hatch-Waxman Act
which states in part that:
[T]he ANDA applicant may assert a counterclaim seeking
an order requiring the holder to correct or delete the patent
information submitted by the holder under subsection (b) or
(c) of this section on the ground that the patent does not
claim either- (aa) the drug for which the application was
approved; or (bb) an approved method of using the drug. 148
Caraco, the generic manufacturer, is trying to manufacture a generic
version of Prandin (a drug designed to treat Type 2 Diabetes). Novo
Nordisk holds a patent for repaglinide (the patented ingredient in Prandin)
in combination with metformin, which expires in 2018.149 Caraco asks the
court to read "an approved method" in the counterclaim statute as "any
approved method" and Novo Nordisk asks the court to read it as "all
approved methods".150
The argument made by Novo Nordisk will allow developmental
pharmaceutical companies to essentially extend original drug patents
through new-use patents related to a method or combination of the
originally patented drug which are part of the NDA use code. 15' This isn't a
patent extension but the use code can block the generic from approval
through the ANDA process. Without the ability for generic competitors to
gain FDA approval, developmental pharmaceuticals can retain their
monopoly on a particular drug well past the expiration of the patent.152 This
statutory interpretation dampens the dual-engine of innovation that the
patent system creates. Without a change in the language or the
interpretation of the statute, developmental pharmaceutical companies will
slowly be able to box out generic competitors. This outcome will harm the
industry and slow the development of new medication.
148 Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 601 F.3d 1359, 1362 (2010)
(citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I) (2006) (also known as the "Greater Access to
Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act" or "Gregg-Schumer Bill")).
149 Novo NordiskA/S, 601 F.3d at 1362.
150 See id. at 1365-66.
' Id. at 1364.
152 With this outcome the generic would not be infringing the patent per se, but they
would not be able to gain FDA approval, eliminating the opportunity to put a
competing product on the shelves. This effectively extends the monopoly held by
the developmental entity past the expiration of the patent.
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V. Novo NORDISK A/S v. CARACO PHARMACEUTICAL
LABORATORIES, LTD
The crux of Novo Nordisk is the statutory interpretation of the Hatch-
Waxman Act's counterclaim language and a generic entity's ability to
challenge the accuracy of the patent information submitted to the FDA
through the NDA process. The holding that Caraco (the generic entity) has
no statutory basis to assert a counterclaim requesting a change to the patent
information in Novo Nordisk's use code creates a scenario where the
generic entity is effectively barred from marketing, distributing, and selling
the drug which perpetuates the developmental drug company's
monopoly. 153 It is important to note that this case was granted certiorari by
the Supreme Court and was argued in late 2011.154 The forthcoming
Supreme Court decision could change the outcome of this case and further
alter the patent law with respect to generic pharmaceuticals.
Novo Nordisk markets and distributes a drug called repaglinide under
the brand name Prandin.155 Prandin is a drug to treat Type 2 Diabetes by
increasing glycemic control in adults. 156 The FDA approved three uses
relating to repaglinide: repaglinide alone, repaglinide in combination with
metformin, and repaglinide in combination with thiazolidinediones. 157 The
FDA Orange Book lists two patents for Prandin: the chemical composition
of repaglinide (the "035 patent", set to expire on March 14, 2009) and
repaglinide in combination with metformin (the "358 patent", set to expire
June 12, 2018).'58 Novo Nordisk owns the 358 patent, but does not own the
other two patents relating to the use of repaglinide. 159 The FDA initially
gave the 358 patent a use code titled "U-546--Use of repaglinide in
combination with metformin to lower blood glucose". 160 In 2005, Caraco
filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application in an effort to gain FDA
approval to market and distribute a generic version of repaglinide. 16' This
ANDA initially contained a Paragraph III certification (stating that the
patent is set to expire on a certain date) for the 035 patent and a Paragraph
IV certification (stating that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by
the manufacture, use, or sale of the generic drug) for the 358 patent.162 This
prompted Novo Nordisk to bring an infringement suit in 2005 against
Caraco based on Caraco's attempt to create a generic version of repaglinide
'13 Novo NordiskA/S, 601 F.3d. at 1367-68 (Clevenger, J., concurring).
154 Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 601 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3057 (2011).
151 Novo NordiskA/S, 601 F.3d. at 1362.
156 Id.
157 Id.158 id.
159 Id.
6°1Id. at 1362-63.
161 Novo NordiskA/S, 601 F.3d at 1363.
162 id.
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patented in the 358 patent. 163 In 2008, Caraco stipulated that its ANDA
would infringe if the label included a combination of repaglinide and
metformin (the 358 patent, which expires in 2018), and moved to amend
their ANDA, stating that they were not seeking approval for the
repaglinide-metformin combination, just repaglinide by itself.1 '64
On May 6, 2009, Novo Nordisk submitted amended information
regarding Prandin to the FDA and updated its use code narrative for the 358
patent.165 This prompted the FDA to remove the use code U-546 from the
Orange Book and replace it with a new code, "U-968-A method for
improving glycemic control in adults with Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus.' 66
Once the FDA approved this new use code, they subsequently denied
Caraco's attempt at an ANDA carve out, and stated that the carve-out label
overlapped with this new U-968 use code. This prompted Caraco to
counterclaim under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii) (the language of Hatch-
Waxman discussing counterclaims), requesting that Novo Nordisk change
the use code for Prandin back to the U-546 code. 167 "Caraco claimed that
the use code U-968 was overbroad because it incorrectly suggested that the
358 patent covered all three approved methods of using repaglinide even
though it claimed only one approved method., 168 If Caraco cannot use this
counterclaim action to compel Novo Nordisk to change this new FDA use
code, they will not be able to gain FDA approval of repaglinide. This means
they will not be able to sell repaglinide even after the drug's patent has
expired. This effectively extends the Novo Nordisk patent past its
expiration date, at least with respect to Caraco, and extends against
everyone else by the amount that this new use code is broader than the
original patent.
The Hatch-Waxman Act enables the ANDA applicant to assert a
counterclaim seeking an order requiring the holder to correct or delete the
patent information submitted by the holder to the FDA, under subsection
(b) or (c) of this section on the ground that the patent does not claim either-
(aa) the drug for which the application was approved; or (bb) an approved
method of using the drug.
169
The two parties disagree over the proper reading of "an approved
method" in the Hatch-Waxman Act. "Novo reads 'an approved method' in
the counterclaim statute as 'any approved method' while Caraco reads it as
163 Id.
164 id.
165 
-id.
166 Id. at 1363.
167 Novo NordiskAS, 601 F.3d at 1363.
168 Id.
169 Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I) (2006) (also known as the "Greater
Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act" or "Gregg-Schumer Bill")).
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'all approved methods.' ' 170 The court holds that the correct reading is "any
approved method" based on a simple interpretation of the plain language of
the patent. 171 Because the new U-968 use code still contains at least one
approved method, repaglinide in combination with metformin, Caraco
cannot compel Novo Nordisk to change this use code and they are now
effectively shut out of the market for the sale of repaglinide by itself until
the expiration of the 358 patent in 2018 (even though the 035 patent expired
in 2009). This reverses the lower court and rules in favor of Novo Nordisk.
The concurring opinion agrees that the majority's reading of the statue
is correct, but recognizes the problem of creating extended patent terms.
The concurrence also disagrees with the dissent, which wants the District
Court to create a solution to this interpretation issue. The concurrence does
agree with the dissent that the outcome is not good for the patent system
and will have a detrimental effect on the pharmaceutical industry. But due
to the clear language of the statute, the concurrence states that any fix
should lie in the hands of Congress.
172
The dissent focuses on the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act to
formulate a way around the majority's interpretation of "an approved
method of using the drug., 173 According to the dissent, the majority
misinterprets "an approved method" as "any approved method."' 174 The
dissent's argument is that the majority opinion allows patent manipulation
that the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Gregg-Shurmer Bill were written to
avoid. They say the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to prevent
manipulative practices by patent holders with respect to Orange Book
listings.175 The majority construes the statutory language directly counter to
this purpose. 176 According to the dissent, the majority has misconstrued the
term "patent information submitted" in the "Greater Access to Affordable
Pharmaceuticals Act.' 77 There is no definition of this in the Greater Access
to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act; thus, the majority ignores critical
statutory language. 78
The dissent also expands beyond the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman
Act and cites other reasons the majority is wrong. The majority thinks that
the overruling of Mylan Pharmaceuticals v. Shalal' 79 is limited to
171 Novo Nordisk A/S, 601 F.3d at 1364.
171 Id. at 1365-66.
171Id. at 1367.
173 Id. (Dyk, J., dissenting).174 Id. (contrary to Supreme Court opinion stating "ultimately context determines
meaning" Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1270 (2010)).
"7 Novo NordiskAlS, 601 F.3d at 1367.
176 id.
177 Id. at 1370-71.
178 Id.
179 Mylan Pharms. v. Shalala, 81 F. Supp. 2d 30 (Fed. Dist. D.C. 2000).
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Mylan.180 According to the dissent, this does not take the context of the
Mylan decision into account and the principles of Mylan should.apply.18 1 In
Mylan, the infringer challenged the accuracy of the listing in the Orange
Book relating the patent with the FDA approved method of use.182 The
dissent elaborated on congressional intent with respect to Mylan and Novo
Nordisk. "Congress acted to provide a counterclaim action to correct such
errors. Congress' concern with the proper listing of the patent in-the Orange
Book does not remotely suggest a myopic congressional focus on situations
where the patent belonged nowhere in the Orange Book, as the majority
suggests."'' 83 The dissent states that even the plain language of the Hatch-
Waxman Act allows:
[C]orrection of a misdescription of patent scope that
includes a drug not covered by the patent and erroneous
information about the relationship between the patent and
the drug, even if the patent is properly listed elsewhere in
the Orange Book. In other words, the scope of the patent
and its relationship to the drug must be 'patent
information'.' 84
The dissent states that "[m]ost significantly, viewing the overruling
of Mylan as limited to complete delisting would be inconsistent with the
explicit statutory language, which provides for correction of Orange Book
information 'on the ground that the patent does not claim ... the drug for
which the application was approved.0 85 The dissent does not see a
difference between drug information and method of use information. The
dissent summarizes this point by stating: "[e]ither both must be 'patent
information' or neither must be 'patent information.' In my view, all
Orange Book information is "patent information."
VI. CAN GENERICS SURVIVE IN THE SHORT OR THE LONG TERM?
After the holding in Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharmaceuticals, the
question is whether generic pharmaceutical companies can survive in either
the short-term or the long-term. The negative effects on the generic industry
are likely to be felt solely in a long-term context but only in circumstances
unrelated to the holding in Novo Nordisk.
180 id.
181 Novo NordiskAlS, 601 F.3d at 1372-73 (Dyk, J., dissenting) ("The problem
in Mylan was that the Orange Book improperly described the scope of the patent
and improperly related the patent to a drug and method of use not covered by the
patent. Reversing the district court, we held that there was no declaratory relief
available to correct an erroneous Orange Book listing.").
"'2Id. at 1373.
183 Id.
184id.
185 Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I) (2006)).
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In the short-term, generic drug companies may actually flourish
because ten of the current best-selling medicines will lose patent protection
in 2011 and 2012.186 This is being called a "patent cliff' by the
pharmaceutical industry.187 Generic drug companies are able to offer lower
prices and this can take almost 90% of sales from developmental drug
companies. 188 Because of this, the patents set to expire between 2011 and
2015 put about $250 billion in developmental drug company sales at risk.189
Patents that expired in 2011 include Lipitor, a cholesterol medication
owned by Pfizer that had $5.3 billion in 2010 U.S. sales, Zyprexa, an
antipsychotic owned by Eli Lily that had $2.5 billion in 2010 U.S. sales,
and Levanquin, an ADHD/ADD medication owned by Johnson & Johnson
that had $1.3 billion in 2010 U.S sales. 190 Patents expiring in 2012 include
Plavix, an anti-platelet medication owned by Bristol-Myers Squibb/Sanofi-
Aventis that had $6 billion in 2010 U.S. sales, Seroquel, an antipsychotic
owned by AstraZeneca that had $3.7 billion in 2010 U.S. sales, and
Singulair, an antipsychotic medication owned by Merck that had $3.2
billion in 2010 U.S sales.' 9' Developmental pharmaceutical companies will
lose a large portion of their revenue because of the patent cliff.192 Michael
Hay, an analyst at Sagient Research Systems, explained the expected effect
these expirations will have on the industry:
The patent cliff facing the industry is very real, with
billions of dollars being stripped from companies' revenues.
Although the vast majority of the drugs losing patent
protection are sold by large pharmaceutical companies that
are well diversified, the amount of revenue that will be lost
is going to be very difficult to make up for.' 93
The actual numbers describing the patent cliff highlight this statement.
The patent cliff is expected to erode $78 billion in worldwide sales from
developmental drugs on patents expiring between 2010 and 2014.194 Almost
half of this lost revenue is expected to occur because of the patents that
expired in 2011.195
186 Melly Alazraki, The 10 Biggest-Selling Drugs That Are About to Lose Their
Patent, DAILY FIN. (Feb. 27, 2011, 8:00 AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/
201 1/02/27/top-selling-drugs-are-about-to-lose-patent-protection-ready/.187 id.
188 Id.
189 id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 The Patent CliffSteepens, NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 10, 12-13 (Jan.
2011), http://www.nature.com/nrd/joumal/vl 0/n1/ful/nrd3356.html.193 id
194 id.
195 id.
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This boom in soon-to-expire patents is a short-term bandage on a long-
term problem now facing the generic pharmaceutical industry. The holding
in Novo Nordisk will allow developmental pharmaceutical companies to
create situations very similar to the famous patent troll situations by
amending their use codes in an effort to perpetuate their monopolies. A troll
patent typically carries some of the following characteristics: it is owned by
someone that does not practice the invention and it is infringed by, and
asserted against, non-copiers exclusively or almost exclusively. Copying is
any kind of derivation, not just mindless replication. It has no licensees
practicing the particular patented invention except for defendants who took
licenses as settlement. It is also asserted against a large industry that is
based on and composed of non-copiers. 196 Novo Nordisk creates a scenario
similar to a patent troll because drug companies would be able to perpetuate
their protection in situations where they hold multiple combination or
method patents which are listed together in the Orange Book. When a
generic files an ANDA, the drug company can amend their use code to add
other patented material causing the ANDA to now be in violation of the
patented information in the use code. This creates an ability to spring a right
to exclude on the generic entity similar to a patent troll springing an
exclusory right on a new developer. A hypothetical of this "troll patent"
situation would be Johnson & Johnson extending the protection of Tylenol
(acetaminophen) by "piggybacking" with Tylenol PM (acetaminophen
and diphenhydramine) or Novartis' Excedrin (acetaminophen, aspirin, and
caffeine); both drugs that contain acetaminophen, in conjunction with other
drugs.
This could slowly shut out generic pharmaceutical companies or at
minimum, limit their growth. Generic pharmaceuticals would be limited to
only producing older generic drugs, and as these drugs become outdated by
newer and more effective drugs, they could be entirely shut out of the
market. Established generic drug companies would still be able to compete
with developmental drug companies on all medications that have already
lost their patent protection. The dilution of the market in favor of
developmental companies would happen over time. As new medications
slowly replace current generics, developmental companies that are able to
extend patent protection through the Novo Nordisk rule will be able to
slowly take an increasing percentage of the pharmaceutical market share
from the generic companies. This hurts the industry because it decreases
competition and will likely eliminate jobs in the generic industry while
leading to higher priced medications for the public. There will still be
competition among developmental companies, but decreases in competition
196 TJ Chiang, What is a Troll Patent and Why Are They Bad?, PATENTLY 0 (Mar.
6, 2009), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/03/what-is-a-troll-patent-and-why-
are-they-bad.html.
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from generic companies will slow the engine of innovation in the
pharmaceutical industry.
This will also make it difficult for startup generic drug companies to
break into the industry. Since a start-up may only be able to produce the
older, pre-Novo-Nordisk generic drugs, they would have to compete with
established developmental and generic companies. There is the difficulty of
initial capital and quality production that presents a challenge to a start-up
in any industry. This difficulty would increase greatly because a start-up
generic drug company would have to compete with established generic drug
companies who have already been forced into perfecting the current crop of
generic medication in order to compete with the developmental companies.
This would place a start-up at the bottom of a hierarchy in which the gap
separating the developmental companies from the generic companies would
become increasingly larger. A start-up would face an almost impossible
task of competing with the established generic manufacturers who can
already price lower based on volume and efficiency. The Novo Nordisk
ruling effectively eliminates the possibility for start-up generic outfits to
broaden the pharmaceutical market with new ventures.
VII. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE Novo NORDISK PROBLEM
There are some potential solutions to the issue created by the ruling in
Novo Nordisk. One positive is the industry now knows how courts are
interpreting the language of the particular statute of the Hatch-Waxman Act
at issue in Novo Nordisk. This knowledge also highlights a flaw in the
language, which leads to the current result of an open door for pseudo-
perpetual pharmaceutical monopolies. The first solution would be for the
Supreme Court to overturn the Federal Circuit's ruling and limit the
protection to just the claimed use, not just any use. This would still give the
protection bargained for by the drug manufacturer without prolonging the
protection on their initial drug development and potentially leading to the
patent perpetuation protection. The court would need to lean on the
legislative history of the statute and rule in the same spirit as the Federal
Circuit dissent. Since the purpose of the legislation was not to allow
developmental drug companies to extend the life of their patents, the
Supreme Court could rule that the language only protects the new use of the
patent.
The major issue with the Supreme Court overruling the Federal
Circuit's majority opinion is the statutory language is quite straightforward.
A commonly used and generally accepted canon of statutory interpretation
is the following:
When the statutory language is clear on its face, and its
words neither create ambiguity nor lead to an entirely
unreasonable interpretation, an inquiring court must apply
2012
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the statute as written, and need not consult other aids to
statutory construction. However, when the statutory
language chosen by Congress is unclear, or capable of
more than one reasonable interpretation, it is proper for a
court to consult extrinsic sources, such as legislative
history, for guidance.
197
If the language was more ambiguous, legislative history and intent
might come into play, but as the statutory language currently stands, that
seems unlikely. The interpretive canon that unambiguous statutory
language should be applied on its face and by its plain meaning should
apply.
Other interpretive canons also do not bode well for the generic drug
companies. A more succinct canon in the same vein as the one above,
states: "Courts are to presume that a legislature says in a statute what it
means and means in a statute what it says."'198 Another negative effect on
Caraco and generics everywhere is that courts are supposed to interpret
statues without considering the effects of the statute, even if the equity may
lie with the losing party. "A court's task of statutory construction does not
depend on evaluating whether one side or another is unfairly affected by the
plain language of the section."' 99
A more realistic solution lies in the hands of Congress. Congress could
amend the Hatch-Waxman Act to avoid the issue of extended patent terms
altogether. This is a similar solution to the one expressed by the concurring
opinion in Novo Nordisk. A simple amendment to the rule could clearly
state that:
[The ANDA] applicant may assert a counterclaim seeking
an order requiring the holder to correct or delete the patent
information submitted by the holder under subsection (b) or
(c) of this section on the ground that the patent does not
claim either- (aa) the drug for which the application was
approved; or (bb) an approved method of using the drug as
long as use of this method does not extend protection of
197 Passa v. Derderian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.R.I. 2004). See Catherine E. Vance,
Some Canons of Statutory Construction, COM. L. LEAGUE OF AM. (2005), available
at http://www.clla.org/new_codedocs/CLLA-canons-of-statutory-
construction.pdf.
198 Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992). See Vance, supra
note 197.
199 Price v. Del. State Police Fed. Credit Union, 370 F.3d 362 (3d Cir. 2004) See
Vance, supra note 197.
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any use of the drug beyond the twenty year patent tenn." 200
(Italic language is an example of added language to a
potential amendment of the rule).
New language could also be introduced to allow the generic ANDA
applicant an opportunity to amend their ANDA anytime the patent holder
amends their Orange Book Use Code. Another amendment would just be to
remove the language "an approved method of using the drug," leaving the
only stipulation "the drug for which the application was approved." These
are only a few examples of congressional amendments to the Hatch-
Waxman Act that can solve the extended patent problem. Hopefully
Congress will agree that this is an issue and try to create legislative
solutions to continue the policy and general execution of the Hatch-
Waxman Act while solving this problem.
Even without any legislative changes or a judicial overturn by the
Supreme Court, there may still be room for generics to survive in the
pharmaceutical industry without any of these proposed solutions because
there are still a large number of generic drugs that generic companies can
manufacture and sell. Also, although developmental drug companies will be
able to block generic ANDA applicants from gaining the FDA approval
required for sale, it will be difficult for these companies to hold the patents
in their Use Codes into perpetuity. This means there will still be medication
patents that expire allowing the generic companies new streams of revenue.
There will continue to be competition between generic pharmaceutical
companies and developmental pharmaceutical companies but the ruling in
Novo Nordisk will limit the ability of generic companies to remain
competitive and will likely lead t6 some losses in revenue, profits, and jobs
in the generic industry. It will also weaken the engine of innovation
provided by generic competitors and slow improvements in the
pharmaceutical industry. This limitation on innovation weakens the
entrepreneurial spirit of the pharmaceutical industry and the U.S. patent
system. It should be overturned or removed to maximize innovation in an
industry with strong ties to the medical and economic health of the
American people.
200 Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 601 F.3d 1359 (2010) (citing
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I) (206)) (also known as the "Greater Access to
Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act" or "Gregg-Schumer Bill")).
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